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PREFACE 
This study has for its purpose a survey of the 
Spanish-American policies during the two brief terms of 
James G. Blaine as Secretary of State. He was much in the 
limelight in the post-Ci v1l War period, and his efforts 
in the diploma.tie field proved to be more worth while and 
more far reaching than the nation at that time realized. 
The source material used in this study aonaisted 
mainly of bound volumes of the corr espondence of the Depart-
ment of State for the yea.rs involved. The background ma-
terial used consisted of recognized books on the forei gn 
relations of the United States and South America, published 
biographies of James G. Blaine, and published writings on the 
Pan -American conferences. In addition various histories 
of the United States wer e perused in order to get the domestie 
. slant on the activities treated in this thesis. Surprisingly 
little on the sub ject was found in any one book. 
Tbe writer wishes to express her thanks and appreciation 
to Dr. T. H. Reynolds , head of the Department of History and 
Political Science of the Okl ahoma Agricultural and Meebanieal 
College, for his supervision and special co-operation; also 
to the library Staff for their invaluable a ssistance. 
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OHAPI'ER I 
James Gillispie Blaine, who was a prominent figure 
in the publl c affa.1 rs of the United States, was elected 
1n 1862 from Maine to the National House of Representa-
tives. He served conseoutively until 1872, hen he bees.me 
a member of the United States Senate from the s ~me state. 
James A. Garfield, upon his election to the presidency in 
1880, appointed Mr., Blaine, who was bis long-time friend, 
Secretary of State. This appointment Mr. Blaine accepted, 
and be remained a member of the cabinet unt1 l President Gar-
field's death. During these months lt-r. Blaine beea.me the 
President's chief adviser , espeeially in determining the 
foreign policies of tbe United States. So influential was 
he that the history of the relations of the United States 
with South America and the polioy of the United States toward 
South American countries was from 1862 to 1892 almost the 
work of James G. ~laine.l 
By the time Mr. Blaine had come into political power, 
1 
the United States bad emerged from a group of states fringing 
the coast of a remote continent into one of the foremost nations 
of the world , with its trade touching elbows with praotieally 
every nation on the globe. 2 The inventions of steam and 
l Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy (New York, 
1915), 384. 
2 James P • . Boyd, Life and Public Services 2.t l!Q!!. 
James G. Blaine ( New Yo~lffl'), 550-563. 
2 
machinery had wrought such great changes in transportation 
as to bring nations into mueh closer rela tions, both poli ti ea.l 
and commercial. Sbips were able to travel rapidly and to haul 
bulky goods, thereby increasing the profits from foreign 
commerce. Because of the proximity of the United States and 
the countries of South America and beeause of the mutual bene-
fit to be derived therefrom, Mr. Blaine was possessed with 
an earnest desire that the United States take a friendly, pro• 
gress1 ve position in regard to Latin America. 'Moreover be 
knew from his years of actual experience in Congress that 
the United States should cultivate more helpful eomm.ereial 
relations with Latin America.3 
Thus one 1 a not surprised that the position whi eh Mr. 
' , 
Blaine immediately took was an aggressive policy not only 
in the development of better commercial relations between 
the United States and Lat1n-.Amer1 can nations but also in th:, 
belief that the United States should ever be ready to arbi -
trate disputes between any two Ameri e~n nations. He believed 
that the Monroe Doetrine was to be extended so as to win a 
positive aid to the development of that part of the world 
which it affected.4 
One such in.stance of good will was to secure the modi-
fication of the Clayton•Bulwer Treaty of 1850, whi oh provided 
for a joint Anglo•Ameri can guarantee of the neutral! ty of any 
3 James G •. Blaine,. Discussions: Legislati'Ve, Diplomatie, 
and :Poli ti eal (Norwi. eh, Conn., l886), 186-193. · · 
4 ~ward Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York , 
1905), 244 ff. 
3 
inter-oeeanic canal that might be constructed between North 
and South America. That Mr. Blaine did not originate the 
discussion is proved by Mr. Hayes• megsage to Oongre1ts lfareb a, 
1880, in whieb he said, "The policy of this country is a 
canal under American control. 11 President Hayes insisted that 
such a. canal must be built under the sole protection of the 
united States and the country through which it was constructed, 
that an isthmian canal . would be ''virtually a part of the 
ooast line of the United States; that our eommereial i nterest 
in 1 t i a larger tban that of all other eountri es while 1 ts 
relation to our power and our prosperity as a nation-, to our 
means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety are matters of 
paramount eoneern to the people of the United States."5 
Likewise President Garfield in his inaugural address 
said, "It is the right and duty of the United States to assist 
and maintain · such supervision and e.utbority over any 1nter-
oeean1e canal across the isthmus that conneots North and South 
America as will protect our national 1nterests."6 
Secretary Blaine reaffirmed this pol1cy,. whieh had been 
approved by Congress and took a def1 n1 te position against any 
European action in tbe way of a guarantee.7 The following 
5 ~. D .. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, Published separately ( ash1ngto'n; D. C., 
1899), ffI-;-505-586. 
6 ~., VIII, 11. 
7 Senate Miscellaneous Document, 42, 46th Congress, 3rd 
session, I, l880•l88l, (Washington, D. c., 1881), 1. 
quotation from Mr. Blaine is proof of this statement: 
If the proposed a.anal were a channel of 
communieation near to the countries of the Old 
World and employed wholly, or almost wholly, by 
their commerce, it might very properly be urged 
that the influence of the European powers should 
be commensurate w1 th their interests •••••. with 
the exercise of such influence the United States 
could find no fault, especially if assur ed of equal 
participation in the peaceable enjo-yment of the 
commercial facilities so afforded. Tbe case, how-
ever, is here reversed and an a greement between the 
European states guarantee jointly the neutrality 
and in effect control the political character of 
a highway of commerce remote from them and near 
to us, forming substantially a part of our coast 
line and promising to become the chief means of 
transportation between our Atlantic and Pacific 
states would be viewed by this government with 
gravest eoncern.8 
4 
Why did Secretary Blaine support this policy regarding 
tbe isthmian canal when he knew that he ould have to struggle 
against opposi t1on that bad most of the argument o-n its side! 
In matters of i nternational comm erce it was generally known 
that England held the highest percentage of trade of any one 
of the European nations. She had had interests in the Canal 
zone since its early history* and by the terms of the Clayton• 
Bulwer Treaty her rights were as distinctly set forth as 
those of tbe United States. 9 
The answer clearly seen is that Mr . Blaine supported 
the ideas of bis predecessors because he was farsi gh ted enough 
to know that British policies, wbioh stood for international 
8 Mr. Blaine to .Mr. Lowell, June 24, 1881, Senate 
Document, 237 • 56th Congress, 1st session, Serial 3853 
(Washington, D. c., 1900), 382. 
9 William M. Malloy , Treaties , Conventions, International 
Acts, Protocols, and Afreements Between the United States 
~Other Power.a (Wash ngton , D. C., l9loT; I, 659-663. 
control of the cana l, would not mean the control of projected 
lines of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific; 
also that it would not lead to cordial relations with South 
5 
.American Republics, both of which were necessary for the United 
States to extend commercial expansion into that region . 
Mr. Blaine moved tow~rd tbe resolution to demand a eanal under 
the ownership and control of the United States Government in 
order to eapture a larger share of the trade of Latin Ameriea . 10 
Mr. Blaine knew the moment a waterway was opened across 
Central America that the producers of the Pacific Coast 
would be brought so much nearer to their markets . that near,. 
ness to markets stimulates production , and that trade and 
commerce could not help but expand . He believed that the 
American control of this canal would cause industries of New 
England to extend commerce into many of the Latin Amert can 
countries . Whether or not Secretary Blaine would have been 
able to secure the dissolution of Clayton-Blllwer Treaty by 
otber arguments is a question that cannot be answered. 
Sir Charles • Dilke , under secretary of English Foreign 
Office in 1881 , showed that there were prominent men in 
England who did share simi l ar views to those of Mr. Blaine . 
He wrote that a good deal of discussion bad taken place 
between the two governments , England and United States, even 
as long ago as 1869, which showed that the British government 
was willing to modi f-y the stipulations of the Glayton-Bulwer 
Treaty. In the disouss:ton of 1861, Mr. Blaine disclaimed 
10 James F. Rippy, La.tin America in World Poli ti c·s 
(New York, 1828), 193. 
on behalf of the United States exclusive privileges in the 
passage, and asserted bis desire to secure its free and 
unrestricted benefit, both in peaee and war, to the commerce 
of the wbole world . That being so, there is not and never 
bas been any real principle at stake.11 
Although Mr. Blaine had advocated the poliey, of the 
dissolution of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty e.nd Construction 
6 
of a canal under American control,. his arguments did not a.ceom-
plisb tbe result he desired; he bad prevented the destruction 
of tbe Treaty of 1846 with Columbia and had stopped the schemes 
12 for a joint guarantee in Central America . 
Another ob jeet which Blaine had to deal with as Sec-
retary of State was that of adjusting t he fo r eign relations 
of United States to the basis of peaee. He was anxious to 
negotiate treaties of peace and amity of commercial alliance 
witb all nations of South America. Mr. Blaine referred to 
this principle by attempting to arbitrate between the 
Republics of Merl co and Guatemala: 
We seek the conquests of pea.ee; e desire 
to extend our eommerce•-Our trade with them is already 
large--but the money does not go to Spanish Amer! ea. 
We send large sums to Europe in coin--to pay Euro-
pean manufacturers for tbe goods whi oh they send 
to Spanish America. Cannot this condition of trade in 
a great part be changed? 13 · 
These two nations, Mexico and Guatemala , had disputed 
for a long time about the own ership of cer tain provinces; 
11 Charles W. Di lke, uThe Future Relations of Great 
Britian and United States," Forum, XXVI, 527 - 528 . 
12 David S. Muzzey, James G. Blaine . (New York , 1,935), 201 . 
13 James G. Blaine, Discussions 1 2.£• ~., 428-429. 
and the Guatemala minister at Washington in letter dated 
June 15, 1881, to Mr . Blaine had appealed to the Government 
of the United ~tates. Mr . Blaine as a result of this appeal 
carried on correspondence with Mr . Logan, American minister 
to Central America. Re said that O~atemale was anxious 
7 
fo r the aid of the United States against Mex1ea.n aggression.14 
A new administration, that of General Gonzalez had 
eome into office in 1881 in Mexico . Mr . Blaine wrote to 
Mr. Mor·gan , the minister to Mexico, stating the friendly 
pol1 ey of the United States and expressing the desire to con-
tinue to enlarge reciprocal trade and interchange of com-
modi ti es, 15 In other correspondence be pressed upon Mr . Morgan 
the importance of Me.xi co• s submitting to a.rbi tra.tion the 
dispute that was pending, because he feared tbat Guatemala 
11might cede her territorial rights in dispute to some Euro-
pean Power", be persisted that otherwise it would be injurious 
to the best interest of all the Republics on this continent.16 
This determined stand shows. that Mr . Blaine was SAnsi-
tive about foreign intervention with the weak ~outhern Repub-
lies. Many passages in his state correspondence demonstrate 
that Mr. Blaine was afraid that these Central American Repub -
~- • 
lies might drift from their independent station toward Euro -
pean assimilation, which would ea.use them to lose their status 
14 wrenzo Montufor to Mr .. Blaine, June 21, 1881, 
Foreign Relations (Wa.sbington, D. C., 1881), I, 613 - 614 . 
15 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Morgan, June 1, 1881, Ibid ., 
No . 452 , 762. 
16 Mr.· Blaine to Mr . Morgan,~., No . 456, 770. 
as independent republics . The Me:xiean publicist, Matias 
Romero, while disapproving Mr . Blaine•s course in this affair 
and defending Mexico on the ground of Blaine's partiality 
to Guatemala, stated that th e making of so "serious a mi stake'-' 
wa.s rta result of bis very earnest desire to have arb1 tration 
take the place of war to end international disputes."17 
8 
Mr . Blaine did mediate as a friend before his with -
drawal from offi ee. lle had become convinced that arbitration 
must be confined to the boundary question.18 There is no 
reason for bell eving that Mr .. Blaine might have been led into 
active inter ference, beea.us,e Mexico would not let United States 
settle tbe boundaries . Ne1 ther were bis apprehensions of 
European intervention or of e. war between the two eountri es 
ever r ealized. He was anxious for peace in Central America 
and expansion of United ~tates commerce without undue inter-
ference witb the domestie relations of any eountry. 
Tb ere was also a boundary dispute bet,.reen Colombia and 
Costa Riea ; and these republics agreed upon the peacefu l 
arbitration of their respective claims. The arbitrator was 
to be the King of ~pain , or the King of Belgium , or the 
President of the Argentine Republi o. ~. Blaine had . heard 
of the proposed treaty; and for the purpose of beading off 
European intervention in the nei ghborhood of a po ss i ble inter-
oeeani c oanal, he sent on May 26, 1881, the followin g noti-
fication of t he objections of the United ~tates to both 
17 Davids. Muzze1 , op • .£!.!•, 207 . 
18 Ibid., 208 . 
Minister Di chma.n at Bogota and Minister Logan in Central 
Ameri ea.: 
Under these circumstanoes while the Government 
of United States of America does not expect or claim 
the position of necessary arbitration in differ en~es 
between these two Republics, it cannot but seem 
strange that Colombia has not communicated to this 
government its intention to submit to arbitration 
the boundaries of the State of Panama, the ter ri-
torial integrity of which the United States of 
America have guaranteed bJ a treaty, the provision 
of which they have been mo~e than once called 
upon to execute--and that it will not hold itself 
bound where its rights, obligations or interests 
may be concerned by the decision of any arbitrator 
in whose appoi ntment it has not been consulted and 
in whose selection it bas not eoncurrea.19 
9 
Secretary Blaine also informed the King of Belgi um20 that 
should His Majesty a.rbi tra.te in this matter, the United States 
would not necessarily hold itself bound by his decision. In 
about the same terms he also gave notiee to the King of Spain.21 
Tbe Government of Costa Rica resented Secreta.ry Blaine's 
dispatches and deferred an i mmediate action . Colombi~, 
because s he wanted the Treaty of 1846 canceled,. was not 
in friendly relations with the United States. 
The whole episode did not tend toward better Latin-
American relations ; but the important intention of Mr . Blaine 
was the determination of non-interference from Europe, and 
this he accomplished. In the words of the Representative 
of Costa Ri ca to Spain tbe position of the United States 
19 Blaine to Logan, May 26, 1881 , Foreign Relations, 106; 
Blaine to lJi cbman, Ibid., 356. 
20 Ibid., No . 50, 70-72. 
21 Ibid., No. 650 ,. 1057-1058. 
was a rt cloud upon the project. "22 Some months later, Secre-
tary Blaine expressed the sympathy of the StBte Department 
with projects for uniting Central American Republics, although 
he declined to intervene or express approval of the use of 
force in accompli.sh1ng tbem_.23 
Another dispute that confronted Blaine was that which 
arose against Venezuela wi th respect to the collection of 
debts whieh she had incurred with European nations . After 
long and futile attempt s to collect these debts , F~ance broke 
off diplomatic relation "in consequence of the t wen ty years 
10 
of bad fa.i th observed by tbat government toward 1 ts oredi tors ••• 
r.rhe question cannot be regarded with indifference , sinee the 
French Government has declared 1 t cannot accept the present 
prorata of the monthly payments and that if Venezuela does 
not accede to her demand that it be increased , the 1''rench 
Government will be forced to proceed in ~ other way . u24 
The Venezuela Governmen t through its foreign minister. 
Mr . Baker , asked the United ~tates Government to assume 
responsibility as to the steps which should be taken to 
make proper provision for payment of its national debts . 
Mr . Blaine notified Mr. Moyes, United States Minister to 
France, nto inform the minister of forei gn affairs that 
Venezuela wants the United States to receive and disburse 
as trustee the increased monthly payments of the diplomatic 
debt in ratio to ,be adjusted---.-that United States reauests 
22 Ibid., No . 659, 1067. 
23 Ibid., No . 385, 603-604 . 
24 Senor Comacho t o Blaine, March 22, 1881, Ibid . , 1202 . 
11 
France to delay aetion while it has this proposition under 
consideration---that the United States offers its kind offices 
for adjustment.n25 
Reports from various persons worthy of confidence e:x-
pressed the belief that b-y September or October tbe French 
Government would be blockading the Venezuelian ports and 
taking possession of tbe custom houses; tbat if this should 
be e:xeeuted, 1 t would be occupation of American terr1 tory by 
an :European State. 26 
Mr . Blaine's interest showed that he we.a anxious that 
justice be done to all parties, because be urged Venezuela. 
to acknowledge the French claim and suggested that the United 
States should place an agent at Caracas in ease of default . 27 
Although the arrangement was not carried out on account of 
Mr. Blaine•s resignation , it is of interest because t his 
proposal to act as collecting agent foreshadowed a course of 
action for financial intervention of a later day . 28 
Mr. Blaine not only stopped an aggressive movement of 
France to seize Venezuelia.n custom houses to compel the 
payment of debt, but be also extended the Monroe Doctrine to 
prevent a ction from abroad . This new principle of economic 
penetration and its resultant political actions were clearly 
25 Mr . Blaine to Mr . Noyes , May 5, 1881 , .!12!.£., No . 736 , 
1212 . 
26 Senor Seijas to Senor C.omacho , June 27 , 1881, Ibid ., 
No . 739 , 1213- 1214 . 
27 Samuel Fl agg Bemis , American Secretaries of State 
and Their Diplomacy (New York , 1927T, VIII , 297-298 . 
28 Carl Russel 1":l.sh , American Diplomacy {New York , 1915), 
385 . 
12 
foreseen by Blaine. 
Another conflict that caused Mr . Blaine a gr eat deal 
of concern wa s the War of the Pacific, which originated with 
the Chilean-Bolivian boundary dispute. It bad been a.greed 
by the nati ons which freed themselves from Spain tba.t the 
boundaries should be tbose of tbe colonial frontiers of the 
early nineteenth century. Since Spain bad been careless 
about boundaries, disputes arose. Bolivia claimed the terri-
tory containing tbe Atacama ni tra. te beds, e. ri gh t which 
Chile never questioned until nitrate and guano deposits had 
been discovered in 1842 . 29 
For some time following tbe discovery of nitrate, the 
fields lay undeveloped. While perhaps worked more energeti -
cally at mining them , but the exploitation of such natural 
riches began in a small way. Protests a.rose over the exploi -
tation both in the Peruvian province of Tarapaca east of 
Iquque and in Antofagasta , then in Bolivian territory . How-
ever the Ghilean financiers and l aborers, backed by Bri tish 
ca.pi tal, enlarged the enterprise so that in course of time 
considerable revenues were realized . 30 In the process of 
developments , disputes aroa e between Chi leans and Bo 1i vi trns , 
whi ch resulted in the Treaty of 1864 by which the boundary 
was fixed at the twenty-fourth parallel, and Bolivia agrAed 
not to raise the tax on Chilean enterprise in Bolivian 
29 Mary W. r/1 lliams, The People and Po 11 ti cs of Latin 
America (Dallas, 1930), 553-555. - -
30 Pan - American Union Bulletin (Washington, 1911), 
XXXIII, 447. 
13 
ter ritorJ between the t wenty - third and twenty- fourth parallels . 31 
From the early outset, Peru and Bolivia had hoped to 
unite, but Cbile had constantlJ opposed such a move. However , 
in . 1873 Bolivia and Peru, out of fear of Chile , entered into 
a secret alliance of defense . 32 
Bolivia violated the treaty of 1878 when she granted 
a eon cession to a Chilean company subject to the 1mposi tion 
of a tax of ten centavos on ea ch quintal of nitrates exported . 
Chi le demanded the suspension of the tax and the a.rbi tration 
of the dispute, and upon Bolivian refusal declRred war . 33 
The Bolivian au·t borities , despite the protests of the Chilean 
government, seized tbe property of the Chilean Company and 
announced that it would be sold on February 14 , 1879, to 
secure the t axes ca lled for. Peru quickly came to t he support 
of her ally.34 Peru and Bolivia were no mateb for Chile ; 
and although the war dragged on from February 1879 until 
April, 1884, the actual conflict by land and sea was brief . 
The Chilean forces were ever-ywhere victorious . 35 
Foreign trade was seriously injured by the war, and 
the European nations early set out to bring it to a. close. 
The United States refused to let European nations interfere 
31 Henry Clay Evans , Chile and Its Relations with the 
United States (Durham, N. c., l9-rr7T,~. 
32 Mary • Willi~~s , 2-E• cit ., 555. 
33 F . Nieto del Rio, "Chile's Conflict with Bolivia 
and Peru'' , Cur·rent History , Dec. 1921, XV, 449. 
34 Mary W. Willia.ms, 2£• cit ., 555. 
35 William Spence Robertson, Histor! of the Latin 
Am er ican Nations (New York, 1924 ), 3 45, =46 . ~ 
14 
and assumed the Nhole burden of bringing tbe war to an ena.36 
The RepresentA.tives of the United States government at a.n 
early period of the war began their exertions to bring about 
a settlement. The first attempt was a conference on board 
the u. s. s. I.eekawanna, which met at the invitation of 
Mr. Os bo rne, the United States Mini star to Sant:t e.go. The 
allies were conquered and Chile, strong in her position, 
demanded oession of territory. The allies replied that this 
demand alone made further negotiation impossible, and the 
conference broke up without any result.37 The Chileans re-
newed the war with sucb vigor that President Pierola wa.s 
driven to the mountains where he established a military 
governmen t. On the seventeenth of January, 1881, t he Chileans 
entered Lima and established a mi 11 ts.rJ government . Wi tb 
utter anarchy in Peru, Chile allowed the establishment of a 
government and the appointment of Dr . Garcia Calderon s.s 
Provisional President. 
Sueb was the condition of the affairs ex1.st1ng in 
Bolivia, Peru, and Chi l e ·when Mr . Bl aine became Secrete.ry 
of State. The Government of Calderon had not been recognized 
by any government ; havin g no real power, it owed its existence 
to the consideration of the victors , who hoped to make it an 
i nstrument of peace on their own terms. Mr. Blaine, seeing 
this, instructed the United l:>tates Minister at Lima, Isaa c P. 
36 H. a. Evans, op. cit ., 100. 
37 Ibid. , 100-101. 
Christiancy, to recognize Calderon , April 9, 1881.38 
Chile was in possession of Peru , and was ready to di e-
tate te:rms of peace . Mr . Christiancy , accordin g to his re-
ports fo rwarded to Washington , showed tbat the political 
machinery of the country v,ras wbo 1 l y paralyzed . 39 
As stated before , Mr . Blaine was concerned with the 
growth of American trade in the nev. world and determined to 
bui ld it up in a way that would rival that of the European 
15 
powers . Beli evin g that the new world republics should renounce 
the European i dea of gaining territorial conquests , be at 
once instructed his envoys to let it be known tha.t t he United 
States wou ld not permit intervention f r om Europe . 40 
Soon after tbe r ecognition of t he Calderon governments, 
Mr . Cbri stia.ney was reca lled from Peru , and Mr. Osborne was 
transferred to Bra.zi 1. General Hurlbut was appointed to 
succeed the fo rmer and General Kilpatrick the l atter . Mr. 
Blaine then stated bis policy by asserting that a victorious 
nation bad no right to demand a cession of territor y, except 
on failure by the latter to pay a money indemnity. 41 
Mr ~ Blaine was determined to have no European inter-
ference , even though the commercial interests of England , 
38 Mu zzey , ~ · cit., 211 . 
39 Senate Executive Document, No . 79 , June 21 , 1881 
(Washington , 1882), 47 Congress , 1st sess ., 917. 
40 James G. Blaine,, uThe Forei gn Policy of the Garfield 
Administr a tion " , op. cit., 411. 
41 Ibid ., 344 . 
France, and Germany were affected by the war to a greRter 
extent than were those of the United States; and he expressed 
himself to General Kilpatrick in such terms on that point: 
The government of the United States s eeks 
only to perform the part of a friend to all the 
parties in this unhappy conflict between Sout·b 
knerican republics , and it will regret to be com-
pelled to consider how far that feelin g might be 
affected and a more active interposition forced 
upon 1t, by any attempted complii~tion of this 
question with European politics. 
Thia showed that Mr. Blaine was anxious that United 
States ministers to Chi le and Feru would be able to clear 
up the trouble between those countries and bring about peace. 
However , Ga.reia Calderon did not reach a.n understanding with 
Chi le a.s be ha,d expected to do. 
General Hurlbut, s.:: soon &s he arrived -in Peru, began 
a series of questionable aots. He took the position that 
there must be no cession of ter ritory on the part of Peru 
and that the United States must interfere to prevent it. 
16 
on August 10 and 17 he expressed these views to Mr. Blaine.43 
In addition to the regular duties of the Minister to Peru 
he a ssumed the task of interpreting Mr. Blaine's instructions , 
and sent the following notifi cation to General Kilpatrick: 
The United titates are not disposed to reco g-
ni ze on this continent the European notion of 
addition to territory by conquest, and as we are 
42 Mr . Blaine to Mr . Kilpatrick, June 15, 1881, 
Senate Exec . Doc., No . 79, 47th Cong ., 1st sess ., (Washington, 
D. C., I SITT!) , """!'57-159. 
43 Mr . Hurlbut to r . Bl aine, Aug. 10, 1881 , Ibid ., 
510- 512 . 
becoming day by day more interested in the com-
merce of the Pa cl fi o, 1 t beeomes de.i ly of more 
importance to us that peace should p~ Avai l.44 
17 
He assu r ed Garc:i.a Calder on, ~ho bad h een devoting him -
self to building up the governnent , that the Uni tP;d St,i.tea 
would inter vene to save Peru.. 'l.!i hen Mr. Calder-on refused 
the denands of Chile and issued paper money made in the 
united States, he was then arrested and t aken to Ssntingo .45 
This procedure of Mr . Hurlbut was, no doubt, fnr beyond 
his authority in that llr . Hurlbut was coaxing the Calderon 
Government from all thougbts of peace and declaring that 
the United States would support the terri torial integrity 
of Peru; on the other band, General Kilpatrick wa.s attempt -
ing to soothe the Chileans, whi le each mi nister in his dis-
patches to the United States was thro ing the blame upon 
the other. 46 
But there is another angle to this most serious f r1 ction 
which caused Mr . Blaine's policy to end in misfortune . It 
developed from the money-making schemes by European and 
American capitalists . Of these finaneial schemes one enter-
prise, the Uredit Industrial, vas organized , and Crochet and 
La.ndeau claims were revived . The Crochet elaim had been 
denied b] Peru. Br . Blaine had nothing to do with this 
45 H. o. EVans, £.E• cit., 109. 
46 Ki lpatrick _to Blaine, Aug. 15, 1881, Fore1fn Relation s, 
No . 101, 136; Mr. Hur l but to Mr. Blaine , Oct . 26 , 881 , 
Ibid., .,.o ~ 575, 942 . 
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claim . 47 The Landeau claim , however , was to be included in 
any negotiations of peace , for the reason t hat John u . Landeau 
wa s an Ameri can citizen apparently en titled under a lawfu l 
contract to r easonable compensat ion for important services 
to the Peruvian government . 48 
The most s erious diffi culty was offered by thB Fren eb 
enterprise , the Credit Indus trial , which had an a.g:r•eem en t 
wi th Pierola to handle exclusive sale of all nitrates and 
guano mined in province of Peru . As Blaine stood so firm l y 
against European inter vention , the :Brench Oompany now appeal ed 
to bim for an Ameriean protectorate . 49 He rejected the plan , 
fo rbidding Hurlbut to lend his influence to the Credit I ndus-
trial and sta ted that it had been caused by r umor s that 
Hurlbut was furtheri ng the scheme . Blaine expressed h.is 
views as follows: 
However trustworthy the Credit Industrial 
may be , I did not consider it proper for the 
Department to have anything whatever to do wi th 
it •.•.• I t is a foreign eorporation ... . .. It is no 
part of your duty to inter fere with its n e~oti ~tions 
with Peruvian governments . If it can be. made an effec-
t ive instrumentali t y to aid that unhappy country 
in its ••••• helpless condition , it would be ungen-
er ous and unjust to obstruct its operation . Your 
duty is negative and. you have fully complied wi th 
your in s tructions by s impl y abs ta.~ing trom ~ll 
connections with the association . · 
-------
47 Mr. Blaine to Mr . Hurlbu t , Nov . 17 , 188 1 , Senate 
Do cument, No. 49, 47th Cong . , IV, 562 . 
48 House Reports ~ No . 1790 , 47th Cong ., VI , XII . 
49 H. c. EVans, .5?..E• ~ . , 111 . 
50 Mr . Blaine to Mr . Hurlbut , Nov . 19, 1881 , Sen . ~ -
~ ., No . 79 , 2.E.· cit ., 564 . 
But what of Mr . Blaine? He openly and offic1 n lly re-
pudi ated the o. cl1er.1es, but secretly be r.1a.y h~tve fnvorod them ., 
especially the Landeau Claims . He did not like to see t he 
foreign bondholders come in for a share wi t h no \r.rnri can 
part i cipa tion .. He had recognized the Calder on governmen t , 
and t he Peruvian people were looking to t he United States 
government a s their only hope of territorial salva tion . 
Under such ci r cumstan ces Peru wou ld doubt less have 
changed ber vi 8\'VS of the worthlessn ess of the Lnndea.v Claim ., 
and "would rather have Landeau have it than thos e other 
fellows 0 who had loaned ber money and taken bonds in return . 
19 
The claim was then to be a pr ior li en upon Peruvian territory, 
and its paJment annexed as a condition to any treat y between 
Chi l e and Peru . 
All of tbi s brought much criticism ; t hose in opposition 
tried to show t hat r . Bl aine bad adopted a policy of aggres• 
sive a ction . 51 lie notified General Hurlbut and General Kil-
patrick that he would no longer need t heir s ervices in the 
settlement of t he pending difficulties. ne selected Mr . 
Willi am Henry Trescot of South Carolina , fo rmer Assistan t 
Secretary of State and one of the most experienced diplomatists 
of this country, as special envoy to Chile, Peru , and Bol1v1a . B2 
The Ameriean minister was instructed to insist that 
cession of territory was not to be the basis of a treaty • 
.. 
51 H. C. Evans_., .2.E· ~ --, 113 . 
52 Muzzey , op . cit • ., 213 . 
Mr . Trescot a ssured the Peruvian governm ent that the United 
States wou ld not permit Chi le to retain both the conquered 
territory and the i ndemnity of tv enty million dollars . He 
felt that the su rrender of Tacna and Ari ca or th e money 
20 
alone was en ough , not both. He wa s earnestly workin g to 
establish peace on t his basis and had had ~ me encourage-
men t of success . 53 Trescot was also to secure satisfn ctory 
reasons for the arrest of Garcia Calderon . The United Stat~s 
was wanting "to see a just and honorable peace a t tbe earl iest 
day practicable" s.nd was vvill1n g to work f or a lasting settle-
ment .54 
tlfhile Trescot v.as working on a. possib l e sett lement , 
Presid en t Garfield was assassinated, Blain e resigned , and 
Frederick l<'reli ngbuys en became Secretary of Sta. te . Mr. 
Fr e linghuysen determined to follow a less aggressive po licy 
and caused t he Trescot efforts to come to naught.55 Th e 
mediation of tbe United States was doomed to failure before 
the start because of incompetent representatives . 56 Mr . Hart 
wri tea, 
Secretary Blaine 's well-meant and sta tes-
manlike efforts to build up an international con -
53 Exec . Doc ., Mo. 49 , .£E.• ill•, 47th Cong., IV, 712 -
715 . 
54 Bl aine to Tresaot , Sen.~.~., No . 79 , 47th Cong ., 
174 -179. 
55 Graham H. Stuart , "Tbe Tacna. , Arica Dispute ," World 
Pea ce Foundation Pamphlets , X, 78 . 
56 H. C. Evan s , op • .£!.!•, 101. 
science among these Latin-American powers was 
a bad failure partly because of the weakness of 
bis agents and partly because be was himself too 
ardent for the ta.sk.57 
Those who were there at the outset had been appointed 
as a reward for humble party loyalty, and those who ea.me a 
11 ttle later were military officers who bad to be eared for 
after the army of occupation bad been withdrawn from the 
21 
South. They were not only inexperienced; they were exceed-
ingly jealous of each other and prone to exeeed their instruet-
ions. And matters were further complicated by three changes 
in the personnel of State Department while the War of tbe 
Pacific was in progress. 
European diplomacy stood ready to mediate , but on two 
occasions the United States frowned upon the idea.. It was 
a task whieh had to be confined to American diplomaey.58 
It had seemed to tbe politieal enemies of Secretary 
Blaine tbat he was responsible for General Hurlbut and Kil-
patriek's proceedings; that he directly encouraged General 
Hurlbut• s outrages upon Ghile; and that he, Mr . Blaine, 
had proceeded without restraint to encourage the schemes 
of these enterprises mentioned before. When the change in 
the administration came, his enemies eaused the United 
States Gongress to demand all of the correspondence to dete 
57 Albert Bushnell Hart, Monroe Doctrine, !B_ Interpre-
tation (Ebston, 1916), 277. 
58 Rippy , op. ~·, 254. 
that dealt with the War of tbe Pacific. The correspondence 
was then made a matter of public record; it laid bare the 
schemes of the American capitalists and the instructions 
to press the Landeau Claim. 
Mr. Blaine was drawn into the factional politics of bis 
party for the purpose of discrediting him and the President. 
In this investigation 1 he declared before a committee of the 
Rouse of Representatives 1 59 which in the spring of 1882 
inquired into certain questions connected with affairs in 
Chi le and Peru said·1 that be was proud of this chapter , in 
his life in which he was connected with a great m~n who was 
gone . (Garfield) 
22 
This admiration for his ~outb American policies is 
justified by the f act that the committee exonerated Secretary 
Blaine and any of the representatives of the State Depart-
ment from any blame in the negotiations of the Chile-Peru 
trouble. 60 
Blaine deelared bis conviction that Great Britian in-
stigated the war between Cbile and Peru in the hope that 
Chi le' s conquest of the nitrate area. would furnish British 
nationals in Chile an opportunity to exploit this commodity. 
Some of the diplomatic agents of the United States appear 
to have held the same view.61 
59 House Report , No . 1790, ££• cit., 242 . 
60 Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 1st sess., 13, IV 
( asbington, D. d., 1882), 5642, 5647. 
61 Rippy , .5?.£• .£!.!•, 111. 
In favoring Peru, he aimed at Chile. The result was un-
fortunate because Chile was antagonized and Peru, the loser, 
was left with a rather deeply ingrained annoyance at the 
united States. Thus the United States lost the good will 
all around. 
23 
24 
CHAPTER II 
Blaine made his presenee felt in all the disputes that in-
volved the nations of Latin America, both among themselves 
and with the European powers$ during his brief period as 
Secretary of State, from Mareh to November of 1881. Although 
attempts wer e made to settle these numerous diffieulties, 
Mr. Blaine saw that no permanent or satisfactory results 
could come until there was an establishment of amicable Ameri-
can relations.l Blaine believed by dealing fairly with these 
nations that trade would be increased and friendship strength-
ened; that common inter ests of a trade of both continents 
could be bound together; and t hat as a result a united front 
could be established against any and all Old World encroach-
ments .2 That he wanted cor~ial relations between the American 
states is evidenced by tbis statement: 
It will be a great gain when we ••••• shall 
be so regulated tba.t each shall acquire the 
highest possible advantage from the enli ghtened 
and enlarged intercourse of all.3 
Secretary Blaine bad noticed that there was a growing 
tendency of Ls.tin-American countries to ask the United States 
to be arbitrator in case of disputes; the realization of 
this caused him to believe that the time was now ripe for a 
1 Charles Edward Russell, Blaine of Maine, 382. 
2 Mary Wi lbelmine Williams, The People !!!£ Poli ti es Q.f 
Latin-.Ameri ca, 778. 
3 Internationa·l American Conference, Senate Document, 
232, 51st Cong., 1st sess., I (Washin gton, 1890), 42 . 
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peace conferenee.4 Although the idea was not entirely origi-
nal with Blaine., it was he who conceived of a Congress of 
I 
.Ameriean Republics to be called at Washington·, D. C,., that 
would lay tbe foundations of a better union of wbieh he 
dreamed~ Tbe project was difficult because so many of the 
republics were emerging from a destruct! ve war, but Secretary 
Blaine went skillfully to work.5 On November 29, 1881, as 
Secretary of ~tate, he extended 
to all the independent nations of North and South 
.Ameri ea an earnest invi ta.ti on to parti eipate 
in a general Uongress to be held in the city of 
Washington on the 24th day of November, 1882, 
for the purpose of considering and discussin g the 
methods of preventing war between the nations of 
Amari ea.6 
He expressed the hope that in setting a day for the 
assembling of tbe Congress so far ahead, th0 war that was 
then in progress on the southern Pacific coast wou ld be ended; 
the nations engaged would then be able to take part in the 
proceedings . 7 Mr. Blaine planned that the work of the Gongress 
was to be for the future, that the United ~tates wou ld not 
assume the responsibility of solving any issues to be presented 
to the Congress, and tbat the United States would be on the 
same footing as any other power . Each state was asked to send 
4 James G. Blaine, "Proposed Peace Conferen cen, Discussions: 
Legislative, Diploma.tic,~ Political, 403. 
5 Charl~s E. Russell, 2£• cit. , 382 - 383 . 
6 Foreign Relations, 1881 (Washing ton, 1882), 13-15. 
7 John Holladay Latane', A History of American Foreign 
Polley (New York, 1934), 646. - ~ 
two representatives instructed to consider the questions 
mentioned in the invitation.a 
Among tbe nations of tbis assembly the United States 
was to be a friend and b.elper, but in no sense was the United 
States to make any com.~itments. To maintain the independence 
of each country w.as to be the eoneern of u.11. Secr~te.ry 
26 
Blaine saw in sueb a combination not only the great possibili-
ties of increasing the trade of the United States but also 
the great advantages to the South Ameriean countries in secur-
i t y and peaceful development.9 
Several of the states accepted the invi tation,10 but 
the time was inopportune; for, it will be recalled, the War 
of the Paci fie was then in progress. Vii thin a month a fter 
the plan was launched, Blaine had been dropped from the State 
Department; and bis successor, Mr. l<'. T. Frelinghuysen, was 
appointed when Chester A. Arthur, who had beeome president 
after tbe death of Garfield, reorganized bis cabinet. With 
President Arthur's approval Secretary of State :£i·relinghuyaen 
canceled the invitations to what would have been the F'irst 
International Ameri oan Gonference. 11 
In a communication addressed to Mr. Trescot, United 
States envoy to c.hile and Peru, Secretary Frelinghuysen 
8 Blaine, op. ~·, gives also a copy of the invitation 
sent to the LatI'n-American States, 403-406. 
9 Russell,££•~., 383, 384. 
10 International American Confer·ence, Reports of Committees 
and Dis cuss ions Thereon, IV,. 222-249 . 
11 Williams, 2.E• ~., 779. 
wrote: 
The United States is a.t peace with all the 
nations of the eartb and the President wishes , 
whether it will conduce to that general peace, 
whi eh we would oheri sh, for thi a government , to 
enter into negotiations and consultations for 
the promotion of pea.ea with selected nationalities 
wi tbout extending a like confidence to her people 
with whom the United States is on equally friendly 
terms. !f sueb pa.rtinl confidence w0u1a· create 
jealousy and 111-wi ll, peaee, tbe object sought 
bj such consultation, would not be promoted. The 
principles controlling the relations of the repub-
lics of this hemisphere with other nationalities 
may, on investigation, be found to be so well 
established tbst little would be gained at t his .2 
time by re-opening a subject which is not novel.l 
The letter closed with the expression that at any event the 
President wished time to consider the entire proposition . 
Mr . Blaine broke his silence when he beard that many 
rumors were being circulated concerning the canceling of tbis 
Congress. He had heard that President Arthur had given out 
tbe information that he knew nothing of the invitation; that 
the meeting of the Congress might cause disputes to arise 
which would lead to war; that on the whole the result would 
be more harmful than beneficial . 13 Because of these cireu-
lating reports Mr . Blaine felt that he must make a statement 
that would express bis ideas of the benefits of the Confer-
ence. 
27 
Thus on February 3• 1882 , in a letter to President Arthur, 
12 Frelinghuysen to Tresoot, January 9 , 1882, Foreign 
Relations , 57- 58 . 
13 Blaine, 2.E• ill· , 405 . 
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a copy of which was sent to the New York Tribune to be 
printed,14 Blaine took the President to task for destroying the 
scheme. In tb1s letter he began with the statement tha t 
President Arthur sanctioned not only tbe peace Congress but 
authorized the invitations to b e sent,15 tba.t the eaneeling 
of the invitation came as a surprise to· him, and t hat he felt 
the reasons so g1 ven were insufficient. Blaine in bis 
"Proposed Peace Congress" defended his actions by saying: 
At present, the condition of trade between the 
United States and its American neighbors is un-
s a tisfacto~ to us, and even deplorable. According 
to tbe official statistics of our own Treasu~ 
Departments, the ba lance against us in that trade 
last year as $120 , 000,000, a ~um greater than 
the yearly product of gold and silver mines in the 
United States. This vast balance was paid by us 
in foreign exchange, and a very large proportion 
of it went to .Eng land, where shipments of cotton 
provisions , and bread - stuffs supplied the money . 
If anything should change or check the bal an ce 
in our favor in European trade, our oomme'l"eia.l 
exchanges with ~Pl nisb Ameri ca would are.in off our 
reserve of gold coin at a r a.te exceeding $100 , 000,000 
per a.nnum , and would probably preoipi ta.ta a suspension 
of specie payment in this country .••••• I do not say , 
Mr . President , that holding a ·peace conference will 
necessarily change the current of trade , but it 
will bring us into kindly relations with all the 
American na tions; 1 t wi 11 promote the reign of peace 
and law and order ; it will increase and will stimu-
late the demand fo r articles whieb American manu-
factures can fu r nish with profi t . 16 
Mr. Blaine closed tbe discussion by asking the President 
to consider again tbis idea of an American Congress and to 
14 Hi span1 e Ameri ean Review, V, 670 . 
15 Gail Hamilton, Biography of James Q. Blaine, 521 . 
16 Blaine, op.~· , 407-410 . 
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consider the material ends to be gained from such a confer-
ence. 17 
Again in 1882 )'lr . Blaine showed his bitterness vrhen 
he wrote a pamphlet on the }breign Policy of the Garfield 
Admini stra.tion,18 i n whieb he said t hat the Congr ess had 
two prineipal objects in view: 
First: 
To bring about peace and prevent future wars 
in North and South Ameri oa 
Second: 
To cultivate such friendly commercial relations 
with all American Countries as would leed to a large 
incr ea se in the export trade of the United States 
by supplying fabrics in which we are aboundantly 
a ble to compete with the manufacturing nations of 
Europe. 
Tbe second object mentioned above would have been gained 
on the realization of the first . Blaine declared: 
Instead of friendl~ intervention here and 
there patching up a treaty between two countries 
today, secu r ing a truce between others, tomorrow ••••• 
it was apparent •••• ,. tbat a more eomprehensi ve plan 
should be adopted:, 1 f wars were to cease on t he 
Western Hemispbere .19 
In short , Pan-A.'1ler1eanis-m as Blaine conceived it 1n 
1882 was expressed in two words, peaee and eomm eree, whi eh 
,ere to be attained by the friendly oo-operation of all the 
American republies and by all of them receiving equa l benefit. 20 
17 Letter to President Arthur , Feb . 3, 1882, Ibid., 410. 
18 ~-, 411. 
19 I bid., 411-419. 
20 Joseph Byrne loekey, Pan•Amerieanism, Its Beginnings 
(New York , 1920), 4. 
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President Arthur i gnored Mr. Blaine's plea . He did 
not change his order, because he felt that Congress sbould 
be given an opportuni ty to consider t be advi sabi li ty of the 
step. 21 No action was ta.ken, however, by the United States 
Congress in 1882; but in 1884, when Congress met , Mr . Blaine's 
ideas to secure longitudinal trade oonditions of the West-
ern Hemisphere received attention in the act which authorized 
the President to appoint a commission to ascertain and re-
port upon the best mode of secur ing more intimate international 
and com."!lercial relations between · the United States a.nd the 
several countries of Gentral and South Ameri ~a.22 The eom-
mission that was appointed obtained much valuable information 
through eonferenees witb merchants of large cities, both in 
the United States and in the countries of Central and South 
Amerioa.23 After fourteen months of travel and investigation 
the commission sent their r eport to Congress , which 'll a.s 
printed and put into circulation.24 
Thus, Mr. B1a1ne1 s comm ercial plan survived in ashing-
ton, and the Senate passed what is known as the F~ye B1 1125 
on June 17, 1886; t his bill, however, did not become a. law 
21 James D. Richa rdson, A Com111ation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents T789- 897, VIII, ffi. 
- --
22 Senate Exee . Doe., 54, I, 51st Cong., 1st sess •. , 
Serial No. 2685~. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
24 Ibid., 23 
25 James R. Boyd,~ a nd Issues of 1 92 (New York, 
1899), 320. 
until May 24 ., 1888 , when the International American Confer-
ence became a posai bi li ty . 26 
The Conference was called by Secretary of State Bayard 
to meet in Washington ., D. c • ., October 2., 1889. All the 
states except Santo Domingo finally accepted tbe invitation . 27 
Though most of tbe Latin-American countries sent only one 
representative ., tbere were in all thirty- seven delegateEJ28 
ten of which were from the United States . The difference 
in the number of delegates , however , established no inequal~ 
ity as an agreement was made t~at the voting should be by 
states . 29 Before the date set, tbe administration ehanged 
at Washington , and Blaine again became Secretary of State. 30 
Mr .. Bl aine mus t have been very grateful when he was 
ebosen president of the Conference , for be assumed nothing 
but good feeling and suggested only harmony in his welcome 
address : 31 
The delegates I am addressing ean do much 
to establish permanent relations of confidence, 
respect, and friendship between the nations which 
26 Ibid., 320 . 
2 27 Joseph Bryne Lockey , t'James G. Blaine" , in Samuel 
F. Bemis's Secretaries of State , VIII , 165- 166. 
28 International American Conference , Reports of 
Committees and Discussions Thereon , 1889- 1890 , I , 49- 54 . 
29 Ibid. , 58 . 
30 Hamilton , 2..E. · cit., 654 . 
31 William C. Fox,t'Next Pan - American Congress.," Forum, 
XXX, 299. 
31 
theJ represent. They can show to t he world an 
honorable peaceful conference of ei ghteen indepen-
dent Ameriea.n powers, in which all s hall meet to-
gether on terms of absolute equality • •••• a. confer-
ence it would in fi ne s eek nothing , pr opos e not hing , 
endure nothing , that was not in the sense of tbe 
delegates, timely, wise , and pea c ,ful. ····'"' e 
believe that fri endsbip and not force , the spirit 
of just law and not violence of the mob should be 
the recognized rule of administration between 
Ameriean nations and in American nations . 32 
Among the subjects discussed during the Conference 
were the preservation of peace; the creation of t be customs 
union; uniform s ystems of weights, measures, and coinage; 
32 
and the promotion of frequent inter-communication among 
the American sta tes . 
The desire for peace among the .American eountri es, as 
already pointed out, became a plan fo r internationa l a rbi-
tration which was declared "to be a principle of i nt ernational 
la.w. n33 
President Harrison expr essed bis idea of the benefits 
of t he vonference in the followin g statement: 
But while the commer cial results which it 
is hoped will follo i these conferences are worthy 
of pursuit and of the interests they have excited, 
it is believed that tbe crowning benefit will be 
found in better securities which may be desired 
for maintenanee of peaee among all American 
nations and the settlement of all contentions by 
methods that a Christian civilization can approve . 34 
A suggestion that arbitration treaties should i nclude 
a provision that in case of war a victory of arms s hould not 
32 International Am~ri can Conference , 1889- 1890, I, 39- 42 . 
33 Williams, op. ci t., 779. 
34 Richardson, 2.£• ~., 33 . 
r 
convey rigbts to the territory of tbe conquere,f·was t :tr6 -
, 
duced at the First International American Conference by 
delegates from Argentina and Brazil . Mr . Blaine had ex-
pressed the ai ms of the Conference as being to cultivate 
an American sympathy , a.nd to form no selfish alliance against 
nations of the Old Worl d . 
33 
The arbitration scheme which Mr . Blaine had so long 
advocated fa.i led to obtain the support that he desired. How-
ever , another proposal came up that in eluded the principle 
of Conquest . 35 Tbe pr oposal created such a heated debate that 
Mr . Andrew Ca.rnegi e , a. delegate from the United States ,. 
brought the debate to a close by asking for a recess in order 
that the delegates might come to an understanding of tbe sub-
ject. After the recess Blaine took the floor , where be 
argued for the new wording of tbe proposal; he felt that the 
mission of the conference would fall short should it fail 
to promote sta.bi li ty and the guaranty of just interna.tiona.1-
1 sm amon g nations of the Continent . 36 
The governments whose representatives adopted the treaty 
failed to approve it . The declaration against the aequia1t1on 
of title by Conquest as a part of the treaty of arbitration 
failed to receive the official sanction of the participa-
ting governments . 37 
;,5 International American Oonferenee, II , .212 • cit., 
1144- 1145. 
36 Ibid. , 1146- 1147. 
37 Iockey , £.E.• ~ ·, in Bemid' s 
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Although Mr. Blaine wa s interested in the policy of 
a.rbitra.tion, be was most interested in the project known a.s 
the customs union . A cus toms union wa.s generally tmdersta, d 
as being tbe establ i s hing amon g sever al nations of a single 
customs territory . Nati ons f ormin g the union should list 
i mport duties on forei gn goods under substantially the same 
t ariff laws, divide the proceeds thereof in a gi ven propor-
tion, and mutually receive fr ee of duty their respective 
manufactured products . 38 
34 
This Customs Union project provided the Conference with 
much heated debate , as many felt that it was ~ntimely to pro -
pose free trade amon g free republics. liowever, the most 
efficient step in that direction was the negotiation of 
partial reciprocity treaties among American nations where-
by each might agree to remove its import duties on some of 
the material or manufactured products of one or more nations 
in exebange for equi vs.lent advantages in reduction of duties . 39 
To many in the conference the idea of reel pro city 
seemed impractieal at this time, as a. Continental system for 
import duties constituted the main source of revenue for 
tbe American republies . 40 Also, the Committee of the Con -
ference in eharge of commercial relations was cheeked by 
the fa.ct tbat during this conference tbe United States Congress 
was occupied with the McKinley Tariff of 1890, which was of 
38 International Amer:1. can Conference , £12 • ill• , I , 103 . 
39 Ibid • ., I, 263-264 . 
40 Minutes of the International Conference , Senate 
Doc ., 231 , 51st Cong7; 1st seas •• XII I , Serial No . 2690 ., 329 . 
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vital interest to the delegates . Secretary Blaine suggested 
and urged with a l l his might that the tari ff be so constructed 
as to compel t he South American countries t o give a favored 
place to American trade . He wrote to Mr . McKinley that the 
bi 11 was ua s le.p in the face to the ::5outh Ameri eans ,vi th whom 
we are trying to enl&rge our trade ••••• such movemen ts ·as this 
for protection wi 11 protect the Republican party into a 
speedy retirement . n41 ! hen the bi 11 crune before the senate. 
Secretary Blaine wrote , "There is no t a section or a line 
in t he entire bill that will open a market for another bushel 
of wheat or another barrel of pork."42 
The Conference decided that 1 t was not time to develop 
a customs union , but the principl e of extending trade by 
mean s of reciprocity received a favorabl e impulse . Like-
wise Mr . Blaine aroused interest among his own people t o 
the doctrine of reciprocity . The hi gh protectionists appeared 
suspicious of any plan which looked toward free trade in 
products in which the United States was i nterested . The 
oppon ents of com"Tl ereial freedom tbougbt t hat it would be 
necessary to admit wool , hides , lead, and copper ores free 
of duty , or at least at a low rate, if reciprocity arrange-
ments which they feared wou ld be ma.de with Central and South 
America . 43 Seeretary Blaine argued that the United States 
would gain the most from any reciprocity agreements because 
41 Hami lton, 2-E· ~ ., 683 . 
42 Ibid ., 686. 
43 D.R. Dewey, Nationa l Problems (New York, 1907), 176. 
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trade would inerease. European trade in La.tin America was 
increasing while that of the United States was decreasing. 
Thus, under pressure the McKinley Aet as passed did inelude 
provisions fo r "the free introduction of sugar, molasS3 s, 
coffee, tea., and hides ••••• for such time as he (the President) 
shall deem just". Blaine suspected that unless there eould 
be a consumption elsewhere of the difference between the 
total of American production and the total of the country's 
purchasing po,er, there would likely be an economic depression . 
If the United States would admit at a r educed rate the 
products of South America, and if tbe South American countries 
would admit at a reduced rate the products of the United 
States, this would bind together in enduring bonds of oommon 
interest the two hemispheres and ward off the undesirable 
agents of Europe.44 But Blaine failed to persuade the Hou se 
of Representatives to incorporate the principle of reciprocity 
into the McKinley Bi 11. 45 
In his discussion of Sec·reta.ry Bls.1ne1 s foreign polio1es, 
Dr. T. L. Reynolds said in the presence of the writer of this 
thesis, nTbe eeonomie fa.etor of Blaine is most important . 
Blaine oamouflaged his real motive to secure fr! ends hip and 
trade in order to secure markets for New !mgland industrialists. 
Narrow as Blaine's view of world affairs was , he had an 
American program which taken by itself was definite and 
44 Russell , .2.E.• .£!.!•, 382 . 
45 Frank w. Taussig, The Tariff History of~ United 
States (New York, 1899), 21ffi"='279 . 
well conceived~.46 
In the State Department, Blaine proceeded swiftly to 
put into operation bis ideas and ideals. He had a vision of 
all the Americas united by common interests and republican 
creeds against monarchical Europe, not hostile to Europe 
but independent of 1 t. His far reaching hope was to make the 
Monroe Doctrine economic as well as political . He knew 
37 
that commercially and to a eertai n extent po 11 ti eal ly, Great 
Britian viewed South America as her own sphere of influence, 
and he was not uplifted by the thought. It seemed to him 
tbat essentially America should have nothing in common with 
any European tradition or "influence''. Great Bri tia.n was the 
hereditary enemy of the United States, and whatever prestige 
she might gain in South America would sooner or later be 
used to the detriment of tbe United States. 47 
All this zeal for trade and arbitration and for the Pan -
American Congress appeared to constitute an evil omen for 
European trade and influence in the Western Hemisphere. The 
countries of I!.'Urope were afraid that Blaine's idea of ex-
pansion would extend so far as to usurp a pa rt of their trade 
and commerce. They were jealous of the growing power of 
tbe United States and of the faet that Blaine bad behind him 
a prosperous nation full of ardor , ambition , and capital. 
The nations of Europe viewed tbe Conference as an 
46 Dr. T. H. Reynolds, Head of the History Department, 
Oklahoma. A. and Id . College, Unpublished Class Lecture, Summer 
1937. 
47 Russell , 2.£• cit., 381. 
opportunity for the United St.ates to make an adv ance, com-
mercially and perhaps to some extent politically, into what 
they considered their spheres of influence. They were not 
uplifted by the thought. One foreign paper saw two dangers 
arising from the All-American Congress, namely, the Anglo-
Saxon power over Latin America and a coalition of American 
states against products of Europe . 48 These statements were 
emphatically verified by the artiole of de Vs.rigney published 
in In Revue des deux Mondes. Re wrote in substance that 
-----
the question was worth investigation by the diplomats. be• 
cause eerta.in oireumstances caused Europe to be against the 
pro jeet. Europe could not sit sti 11 and let Mr. Blaine, the 
"American Bl..smark", expoit the product of the Latin American 
na.tions.49 
Also, the British press denounced Secretary Blaine. 
Some British newspapers diseovered that he bad a monstrous 
scheme to unite both Americas into an absolutism under his 
own di ctatorsbi p. 50 Great Bri tian and other European coun-
tries were supplying South America with articles that might 
as well be furnished by the United States. 
Blaine could see in such a conference great advantages 
38 
and possibilities in profits. ~be attention of the conference 
48 Wilgus , Curtis A., "Blaine and the Pan-American Move-
ment", H1s,an1c American Historical Review (Durham, N. Car., 
l 918) , v, o3 .. 
49 de Varigney, 0- ''un Homme d' Etat Ameri ean", In 
Revue des ~ Mondes ( Par1 s, Jan. 15, 1890), 97, 433'::i62. 
50 Russell, £.E,• ~·, 383. 
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bad been to a great extent devoted to the consideration 
of measures designed to foster and promote trRde between 
the United States and Latin Amer ica, but Mr. Blaine's aim seemed 
to be to allow full freedom for discussion s.nd decision with -
out any pressure or suggestion from the United ~tates.51 
Secretary Blaine, too, must have been aware that the 
surest way to have the confer ence a. failure would be to take 
issue with these opinions ooming from certain European nations, 
who , be felt, sought their own advantage by wanting to stir 
up conflicting changes and strife. If so, this would mean 
defeat of the conference, and would , therefore, appeal to 
the business interests of Europe.52 Secretary Blaine skill-
fully avoided a ny such happening . 
The Conference adjourned April 19, 1890. Mr . Blaine 
said in bis farewell address that be was gratified at the work 
that bad been accomplished by the Confer ence, that the results 
of this work would be defined with time, and that experience 
would confirm our present faith. 
If in t his closing hour, the Conference 
bad but one deed to celebrate, we should dare 
call the world's attention to the deli berate, 
confident, solemn dedication of t wo great con-
tinents to peace and to the prosperity which 
bas Reace for its foundation. We hold up this 
new 'Magna Charta", arbitration between the 
American Republies, as the first and great fruit 
of the International American Gonference.53 
51 Matias Romero ,"Tbe Pan-American Conferenee"(l890), 
North American Review, 151, 358. 
52 de Vari gn ey, c-, .2.E• cit., 453-454. 
53 Inter national Ameriean Conference, .2.E• ill•, II, 
1166-1167. 
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He adjourned the Conference, and without delay he wrote 
a letter to President Harrison submitting the report of the 
Conferenee. This report was given to the United States Con-
gress June 19, 1890. The report was given also to the several 
La.tin -American states. The governments whose representa tives 
adopted the treaty of arbitration failed to approve it;- also 
the declaration a.gs.inst the acquisition of title by conquest 
as a. part of tbe treaty of arbitration, which Secretary 
Blaine desired, was not adopted .54 
Mr. Latane' in bis discussion of Pan-Americanism wrote 
that the oreation of the Bureau of tbe Am.eriean Republies was 
the tangible achievement of the Fir.st International Ameri -oan 
Oon f eren ee. 55 
Of course this Bureau bas developed into a very valuable 
organization for common underst-and1 ng, the outcome of wh1 eh 
was the Pan-Amer1 can Union with the erection of a beautiful 
building in Washington, D. c.;66 but there is no use to deny 
that other achievements can be pointed out with just as far-
reaebing eonaequenees. The several conferences which have 
met sinee that time have proved valuable.57 Thus, Mr . Blaine 
and the First International American Conference should have 
a share of the credit, because the conferences have continued 
54 I.oekey, ~- eit., in Bemis 's 2.E• _ill., V!II, 778. 
55 Latane1 , 2.E• ~., 661. 
56 Wi 111 ams , 2.£. ei t • , 780 • 
57 wckey, ~· cit., in Bemis's 2.E• .£ii•, VIII, 180. 
to be a force. Mr . Eli bu Root58 in a speech in New York 
December 20, 1889, spake of the delegates as bein g '' ••••• 
the advance guard in the greatest movement since civ111za-
tion began toward the brotherhood of man and the federation 
of the orld" .59 
Indirect and distinct results must be taken into 
a.ecount. Unquestionably harmony and understanding between 
the nations were b~gun; also research and investigations 
were started and encouraged. 
The Conference was a step forward, and its work was 
41 
ea.rried further by the genius of Mr . Blaine and bis associates. 60 
His hardest battle, as I have sbown before, was with Congress 
over reciprocity. 
Reeiproci ty was a difficult problem to solve. The 
most efficient step in that direction was the negotiation of 
partial reciprocity treaties among American nations whereby 
eacb migbt agree t? remove its import duties on some of tbe 
materials or manufactured products of one or more nations in 
exchange for equivalent advantages in reduction61 of duties. 
Secretary Blaine fought for reciprocity in trade and 
against the aetion of Congress. He protested that Congress 
58 New York lawyer who beeame Secretary of State in 1905. 
59 Sen.~· Doc., 232, op. cit., III, 295. 
60 Fox, -2.e• ~., XXX, 299. 
61 International American ~onferenee, 232 , 2.E.• eit., 
I, 103-120. 
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was throwing away the most promising opportunity for increas-
ing United States exports to the disadvantage of the great 
agricultural regions of the United States.62 
It is necessary to keep in mind that in his efforts of 
the International American Conference and in his encourage-
ment of the reeiprocity movement, Mr. Blaine did produee lasting 
results. Secretary Blaine understood much more clearly than 
some of his contemporaries that the ohanging industrial con-
ditions were destroying American separateness.63 
Secretary Blaine was a statesman who was looking after 
long-time legislation. He recognized the changing imperial-
ism. He bad lived in a period of great change. belonging as 
much to the period of Secretary Seward64 with his ideas of 
expansion as be did to the economic penetration in wbi eh the 
European nations were involved. lie was opposed to this 
economic penetration of Europe,65 as well as to the political 
penetration under the Monroe Doctrine, wbieh was gradually 
blending in dth the new Pan-Americanism.66 
Secretary of State B1a1ne1 s efforts to build up senti-
ment in favor of closer trade relations between the United 
62 F,dwa.rd Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the 
Nineteenth Centur~ (Boston, 1904), 276-280. ~ ~ 
63 Carl Russell Fish, "Blaine and His Pan-America.nismu, 
The Chronicles 2£ America, XLVI, 65. 
64 Berni s, .£,£. cit., VII, 1; Willi am H. Seward was 
Secretary of State Mareh 5, 1861. 
65 Fish, op. E.!.!•, 63-64. 
66 Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics 
(New York, 1936), 452-453. 
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States and its neighboring republics has increased eteadi ly 
since bis time. Although tbe meaning of Pan-Americanism has 
changed since the time of Secretary Blaine and the First Inter-
national A.meriean Conference , no doubt Secretary Blaine• s 
great purpose of peaceful relations and mutual interests 
between the United States and La.tin-Ameri ean Countries has 
helped to soot be over e.gi tations tbat otherw1 se might have 
caused grave differences and perhaps bloodshed . 
On the whole he was a.bead of his time~ 67 so that many of 
his poiieies ba.ve been advanced and extended by his successors 
without their realizing that these same ideas were onee tbe 
policies of James G. Blaine. Thus, it must be admitted that 
tho United States bas experienced a considerable degree of 
success in tbe realization of Latin-American policies beeause 
Mr. Blaine was a man of vision in a fast changing world . 
67 Russell, ~· .£!.!•, 382, ff. 
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CHAP'L'ER III 
Scarcely had the ~irst International American Conference 
adjourned when the United States became rather serio~sly 
involved in the Chilean affairs in conne ction with the Civil 
War between President Balmaceda and the Congress! ona 11 sts. 
Senor Don Jose Manuel Balmaceda was installed as Presi-
dent of Chile, September 18 , 1886. Although it has been 
claimed tbat he aecomplisbed more in bis five years• term. 
than all his predecessor s combined, be was in constant con-
flict with his Congress throughout his admi nistration.l In 
1890 it refused to vote the budget for the coming year . This , 
eventually, caused President Balmaceda to issue an illegal 
decree effective January l, · 1891, declaring in force the esti-
mates of the preceding Congress. This decree b:i:~ought a.bout 
an armed revolt by President Balmaceda against the Congresa-
ionalists, which declared t he President deposed for violation 
of the constitution.2 
The Congressionalists had the support of the navy , whioh 
seized the ri~h nitrate section, the revenue from which pro-
vided funds for the conduct of the war. British and German 
firms, because they felt tbat their future welfare in this 
district depended upon the success of the Congressionaliste, 
contributed li berally to their eause.3 
1 Mary w. Wil l ia'lls , The People and Politics of Latin 
Amari ea. , 604. 
2 Ibid., 607. 
3 Henry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the 
United States {Durham, N. Car., ffl71,138. 
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Although the Balmaceda government had the support of the 
army , 1 t was not strong enough to overthrow the Con gr esEU.ona.1-
i sts , and was , t herefore , defeated late i n August 1891, eausing 
Bl amaeeda to a.b1..i ca.te. In t he fo l lovYing September he eomm1 tted 
suicide with a pistol at the Argentine legation ·where he was 
staying.4 The revolution came to an end with the beginning 
of e. new provisional government under President Jorge Montt. 5 
This revolution in Chile caused diplomatic questions to 
arise also in the United States. However, persuing a unifonn 
policy of maintaining friendly relations with the established 
government , the United States up to the overthrow of Ba lmaceda 
recognized him a.a the legi timate president.6 But this reo.og-
nition was a cause for occurenoes of so serious a nature that 
the United States and Chi le v ere nea.rly involved in war . 
Secretary of State Blaine and his Minister both took a moderate 
view of the situation. The chief purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the part that Blaine played in this struggle. 
The eboi ce of the mi n1 ster of the United States to Chi le 
in 1891 was Mr . Patrick Egan, who had been appointed by 
President Harrison at the request of Secretary Blaine. Egan, 
who had become a naturalized citizen of the United States, 
was a native of Ireland. He was a man of honor,7 and those 
4 Wi 111a.ms, £E. o1 t .. , 608 .. 
5 Ibid., 608. 
6 .John w. Foster, nAtlantic Pan-American Diplomacy", 
Atlantic Monthly~ (Boston, 1840), LXXXIX, 484. 
7 Harry 'fhurston Peck,. ttA Spirited Foreign Poli ey 0 , 
The Bookman, XXI (New York, 1895). 
who knew him spcke hi ghly of his business ability and his 
eha.rs.eter.8 
The United States foreign policy with Chile between 
1890-1892 had its share of criticism botb at home and abroad. 
The chief cri ti ci sm was tha. t the United States failed to re-
main neutral during the revolution. The critics placed 
the blame for the strained relation between the two countries 
upon Blaine's appointment of Egan; for reasons that Egan had 
no diploma.tie experience, and be was lea.st suited to serve 
in Chile than in any of the Latin -American states because of 
the close commercial co nnections between Chile and England .9 
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Opponents of Mr . Blaine and the Harrison Administration 
began to investigate Egan• s past and proved to their own satis-
faction that the hos ti 11 ty of Chi le toward the United States 
was largely due to this minister's aetions ;lO that Egan was 
a wandering foreign adventurer whose residence in the United 
States had been brief, his reputation shady, and bis actions 
questionable since he had allied himself with a would -be 
dictator. Concerning this statement two prominent contempo-
rary historians, Albert .Bushnell Hartll and John Spencer 
8 Albert Bushnell Hart, n Chi lean Controversy", Praeti c-a.l 
Essays ~ American Government (New York, 1905), 79. 
9 William E. Curtis, From the Andes to the Ocean (New 
York, 1907), 409. - - - -
10 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, 1899 (New 
York, 1906), IV, 399. ~ 
11 Hart, op • .£!!•, 108-114. 
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Bassett, were of the same opinion.12 
Just why should sucb an individual be appointed by Mr . 
Blaine to represent tbe United States 1 s a question that 1 s 
interesting but difficult to answer. Since the Irish vote in 
doubtful states was courted by tbe Republ1 can party in the 
eleetion of 1890, Egan• s appointment to the Chilean post 
might bave been to gain the good wish.ea of the Irish for the 
Republican party. Perhaps this appointment was made with the 
hope that Egan, who hated all things Bri tisb• would oarry this 
hatred with him to Chi le, where be made enemies amon g the 
English residents. Perhaps both Blaine•s and President 
Balm.aeeda' s well known antipathy for the English in Obi le 
influenced the appointment,, and perhaps Blaine did expect 
Egan to e.dvan ee .the interests of the anti •Engli sb eapi tali sts, 
because Egan wrote to Blaine: 
The hostile spirit of England and Germany 
must show every Chilean patriot that he should 
cultivate elosI commercial relations with the 
United States • . 3 
Mr. Egan was favorably received by the Balmaeeda Govern-
ment~ and both took special care to cultivate these eordial 
relations,. Mr . Egan referred to this modification by ate.tin g 
that the relations between the United States and Chile were 
better than they had been in the past.14 It did appear at 
12 Johns. Bassett,! Short History of the United States 
(New Yol"k, 1921), 771. 
13 H. C. Evans, 52.E.• .£!.!•, 138 . 
14 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Feb. 10, 1891, Foreign 
.Relations, 1891 (Washington D. c., 1892), 104. 
this time that Egan was precisely the proper one to turn 
Obi le away from the European influence and toward the United 
States. Mr. Egan• s correspondence with Secretary Blaine 
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showed that be must have been favorable to the Balmaceda Govern-
ment .15 During the Civil War between Balme.ee<la and the Oongress-
ional party, Mr . Egan admitted to the American legation eertain 
adherents to the Obilean government and hinted that the cause 
of the revolutionists did not attract him.16 
Egan, however, hoped for a truce; and through Rear 
Admiral MeCann, then stationed 1n Iquique harbor, he tried 
to sound the Congressional Government as to 1 ts ideas on the 
matter. Egan's attempt was of little consequence, for the 
revolutionists believed that the Amerioan Minister was hostile 
to their cause bees.use be expected them to lose.17 If Egan 
were wrong in bis opinion that Balma~eda would win ., t hen the 
American naval authorities on the Chilean coast were wrong 
because they held the same opinion .18 
As the months passed, President Balmaceda influenced the 
American press in behalf of his cause until the whole of Gbile 
15 Mr . Egan to Mr . Blaine, Mareh 17, 1891., Ibid., 107. 
16 Mr. Egan to :Mr. Blaine, June 9, 1891, House Exeeut1 ve 
Document, 91, XXXIV., 52nd Cong., 1st sess • ., (Washington. D. c., 
1892), 47. 
17 H. c. Evans, op.1 ~., 139. 
18 Rea r Admiral McConn to Mr . Egan., May 25, 1891, 
House ~ • ., Doc. , 2£. ei t. , 48 • 
seemed to think that the United States was partial to tbe 
Chilean Oovernment.19 
'fhese indiscretions of Mr. Egan were of minor importanoe 
as far as the revolution in Chi le was concerned, bees.use the 
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United States he.d taken no offleial part. However , the blame 
fell on bis shoulders, and it was not to be thwarted by the 
work of Egan; Balmaceda:• s adversar1 es in Cb1 le sent delegates 
to Washington, D .. c., to present their claims as a belligerent 
nation. The President of the United States, however, not 
wishing to prejudge the que:stion of recognition of a revolu-
tionary movement , refused to receive tbem,20 an aet in aocor-
danee with the traditional policy of the United States tbat 
a government to be recognized must be 1n actual eontro1.21 
This refusal to recognize the revolutionists was ex-
pressed when the United States displayed offensive zeal in the 
capture of the Itata, a vessel which was carrying anna and 
munitions for Cbilean insurgents. 22 The seizure of the Ite.ta 
was order ed by the United States Attorney General, w. H. 
Miller, aa a result of the claims made by Senor Don Purdencio 
Lazcano$ the Balmaceda representative in Washington. Lazeano 
insisted that the !ts.ta was in an American port for the pur-
pose of transactions which would constitute a breach of the 
19 :a: . C. Evans, 2£• ~· ,. 138. 
20 Mr . Whorton to Mr. Egan, July 21, 1891, House 
Exe cu ti ve Do eument, 2.E.. ei t., 57-58. 
21 Mr . Egan to Mr. Blaine, Sept. 7, 1891, ~., 71. 
22 James Daniel Rioha.rdson, Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers 2.f tbe President, IX, 184. 
23 , United States• neutrality laws. 
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Lazeano had approached Mr . Blaine, Secretary of State, 
with the information that the Balmaceda government bad issued 
a decree forbidding the importation of arms into Cbile.24 
His aetion was prompted, he said, beeause of the presence in 
New York at that time of Trumbull, an agent of the · Obi lean 
revolutionists, whose purpose was the purchasing of arms a.nd 
munitions to carry on the revolution in Ghile.25 This attempt 
of Lazcano to prevent sbii:tnent of the arms from the United 
States was unsuccessful. Secretary Blaine told him that in 
aeeorda.nee wi tb international law and the la!fs of the United 
States the exportation of arms was not forbidden; but that 
if he wished to make a test of the laws, the eourts were at 
his disposai.26 
In the meanwhile Trumbull s hipped his purchases across 
the united States to San Franei sco where the guns were loaded 
on the Ameriean ship, the Robert and Minnie, a coastal trade 
ship, wb1eh had been chartered by him. ~he steamer Itata 
suddenly departed, taking along the American official who 
bad been placed on board by United States authorities to 
detain 1 t. The marshal on board wa.s dropped at a point on the 
' 23 Senor Lazcano to Mr. Blaine , May 5, 1891, Foreign 
Relations, 1891, 316. 
24 Osgood Hardy , nTbe Itata Ineident1•, Hispanic American 
m.storieal Review, V (Durham, N. Car., 1926), 202. 
25 Foreign Relations, 1891, 314. 
26 )tr. Blaine to Senor Lazcano» Ma.reb 13, 1891, House 
Executive Document, 91, 2.E.• cit., 197. 
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coast.27 The Robert ~ Minnie transferred her cargo to the 
Itata somewhere near the Catalina Islands, and she sailed at 
once for Cbile.28 Whether tbe action of the Itat~ in loading 
the arms from the other abip eonst1 toted s. violation of the 
neutral! ty la.vs was a debatable question, but President Harrison 
was indignant over the affair and had two warships detailed to 
follow the Itata. The Itata reached Iquique, Chile, where it 
was at once put in custody of the United States squadron under-
Rear Admiral McCann, who bad already been assured by the Con-
gressionalists that the Itata would be turned over to him as 
soon as it was anchored. 29 It eould not be asserted, however, 
that the Itata had broken any law. The officers of this ship 
were tried in tbe United States courts in California where 
the ease was discbargea .30 The United States, nevertheless, 
appealed the oa.se, not because of a desire to condemn the 
Itata, but because the ease was one involving international 
law and one on which the United States desired e. correct 
deeision.31 This higher court, too, upheld the lower courts' 
deeision32 that the transaction was a legitimate commercial 
27 Richardson, £.£• cit., IX, 183. 
28 Hardy, op.~., 107. 
29 Rear Admiral Mcaann to Mr . Tracy , May 16, 1891, House 
Executive Document, 91, £.E.• _ill .. , 255. 
30 H. C. Evans, 2£• ~·, 141. 
31 Richardson, 2.£• ~., IX, 184. 
32 Hardy, 2.E.• cit., 224. 
52 
venture.33 Thereupon tbe Itata was released and allowed 
to return to Obi le. The revolution had been brought to n eon• 
elusion before the !tata returned, yet the Chilean citizens 
felt that the United States was siding Balmaceda by preventing 
the munitions from being delivered. The Itata a.ffe.i r ean 1 n 
no way be connected with the Department of State. The Itata 
incident kept alive suspi oion and hatred toward the United 
States, but there is no proof that Blaine had anything to do 
with its ebase or return .:54 There was a great deal of news-
paper comment which reported. that wbi le Attorney General 
Miller and Secretary of Navy Traey felt that the Itata should 
be returned, tbe rest of the administration did not.35 
The United States navy was unpopular in Chi le as e. result 
of this Its.ta affair, but other incidents oeeurred which 
heightened the resentment of the revolutionary party . 36 The 
cable line owned by the Central and 8outb American Telegraph 
Company, incorporated in the United Stat-es, connected Chi le 
with the outside world. The process of layin g the ca ble at 
Iquique was not stopped by the revolutionists who were 1 n ron -
trol there. Through Mr. Egan's efforts the United States 
squadron gave proteetion to the cable company whi eh made a 
33 J'obn B. Moore , "Chilean Controversy", Political Science 
Quarterly~ VIII, 469. 
34 Ri cbardson, .2£• .ill•, IX, 184. 
35 Hardy, £.E_• ill•, 224. 
36 H. c. Evans., 2.l?.·• ill•, 141. 
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direct off-shore connectlon. 37 On tbe night of June 20, 1891, 
the cable was cut in the open sea and the connection made. 
By this action Iquique was cut off from eable service, wbieh 
of eourse was a serious blow to tbe Oongress1ona.11sts.38 While 
tbe eutting of tbe cable was a eommercia.l act of a private 
eompany, it was taken by the Oongressionaliets as more attempts 
on the part of the United States to aid Balmaeeda.39 
Late in August of the same year oo-eurred another irri ta.t-
ing incident which eantributed considerably to the strained 
relations between united States and Chi le. It was rumored 
that the revolutionists were to land a foree e.t Quinteros. To 
verify this report, Admiral Brown, Commander of the United 
States South Pacific fleet, went asbore at Valpariso to get 
tbe news of tbe landing for bis own information . That the news 
of the landing reached the city before his return to the fleet 
caused him to be held responsible for the leak.40 He was 
s.eeuaed from tbat time as being a Balmaceda spy• wbl eh did not 
refleet eredi t on the United States navy. 41 
Although it was possible that the charge against Admiral 
Brown was a fa.l:tebood, the report was aeeepted as true by the 
37 Moore, .2.E• ~., 470. 
38 House ~· ~-, 91, £I?.• ei t., 588-589. 
39 H. a. Evans, £E.• cit., 142. 
40 Rear Admiral Brown to Mr. Egan, Sept. 8 , 1891, House 
~- ~-, 91, ~- ~-, 75 ff. 
41 H. C. Evans, .£2• ill•, 142. 
average Chilean,42 and was capitalized by anti-American in-
terests to eonvinee the Congress1onalists that the United 
States was aiding the Balmaeedists.43 Once again, for the 
cable affair and for the aceusations of Admiral Brown, no 
blame can be attached to Secretary Blaine nor to Mr. lf.gs.n . 44 
It is not surprising that the Congressionalists believed 
that these three contemporary acts, the Itata affair, the 
Cable affair, and the ~uinteros Bay Episode, eommitted by 
indi vi due.ls acting for the United States, bad openly aided 
Balmaceda.. 
Notwithstanding these disturbing incidents the new pro-
54 
visiona.l government under Jorge Montt etarted out in September, 
1891, with a hopeful outlook. On September 1, Mr. Egan 
telegraphed that the Oongressionaliste were fully installed 
and inquired whether he eould "recognize the new government« , 
adding, rtEVerything is tranqu1 l". On September 4, he was 
instructed to reo.ognize the government 1 f 1 t was accepted 
by the ~eople.45 
The life of tbis government , of which Senor Matta was 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ma.y be considered as 
42 House~· ~., 91 , £1!• .fil•, 75, 277. 
43 Moore, op • .£!!•, 471. 
44 John Trumbull , "our Neutrality in Ohile'', The Nati on 
(New York, 1892), LIV, 50, ad~~ts that he was unab~to 
obtain any proof of wrong doing. 
45 Moore, .2.£• !'!!•, 471. 
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eoineident with a second period in the relations of the United 
States and Chile. In this first period, January 1891 to 
September 1891, it seemed that there were mistakes made 
wbi ch gave the Chi lean revolution! sts causes for resentment 
against the United States. In the seeond period, September 
1891 to January 1892, these mistakes were Chilean, while the 
State Department was clear of censure. 
Mr . Egan reported on Septt\'?llber 17, 1891, to Secretary 
Blaine that many of the young and unthinking Chileans bad a 
bitter feeling against the United States; but, on the other 
hand, the more reasonable men admitted t ha. t the United States 
took the eonsistent course. The hosti l.e elemen·t let no oppor-
tunity pass of misrepresenting every thing_ pertaining to the 
United States.46 
The death of Balmaceda as follo ed by the destruction 
of houses and property , causing many of bis friends to seek 
an asylum in the American legation.47 This, too, added to 
the bitterness of tbe young element in the new government 
when Egan allowed son1,e eighty of the Balmaeedi st refugees in 
the legation.48 Mr. Egan kept them at great expense, reporting 
that he would permit them to leave onl~ under safe conduct 
to a neutral territory.49 
46 M.r •. Egan to Mr. Blaine, House ~ .. Doc., 91, 2£• 
~·, 74. 
47 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, September 29, 1891, Foreign 
Relations , 1891, 170. 
48 H. a .. Evans, £E. ~·, 143-144. 
49 Foreigp Relations., 1891, 166-171. 
The rt gh t of the asylum had been disputed, and the f act 
that the demand fo r safe conduct had no standin g in inter-
nationa l la.1"i50 was here brought out, because all t.hA leg~~ion 
bad admitted ~efugees except the British .51 
56 
One aeti on in particular which commanded unusua 1 interest 
resulted from tbe method employed in handling the refugee prob-
lem . The right of asylum wa.s not denied by the Gbilean govern -
ment , nor did it ask the American legation for the surrender 
of the refugees; it denied, for a whi le, however , the right 
of safe conduct. 52 It is true that Egan did receive more refu ... 
gees than were received by any other Ambassador in Santiago .53 
Mr . Blaine was quite willing to give that tempest torn 
.state alliple time to get on its feet and come to its senses. He 
felt justified in waiting until the new ministry s hou ld be in 
office, provided , of course, that no new source of friction 
should arise . Miss Hamilton in her biography of Blain e states:54 
Mr. Blaine was disposed from ever-y motive to take 
a moderate view of the situation. Mr . Blaine would 
waive no hair's breadth of the right of asylum and the 
President refused even to consider the question wheth er 
a.sy lum had been properly given unti 1 the privileges of 
the legation were restored , but toward a country rent 
by 1.nternal wars, Mr . Blaine believed every considera-
tion should be shown . 
50 Moore, .2£· .ill•, 478. 
51 H. c. Evans, 212• .£!!•, 144. 
52 Moore, £1?.• ~·, 479. 
53 Forei ~n Relations, 1891 , 171. 
54 Gail Hamilton, Biography of James G. Bl aine (No:rwich, 
Conn., 1895), 675. 
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But this course was offensive to the revolutionary leaders 
and to their supporters in Valpariso. The actions of these 
revolutionary leaders made it diffieult for Mr. Egan to car ry 
out Mr. Blaine's wishes; however b1r. Egan kept the :refugees, 
as there was nothing else he could do sinee they were in 
dreadful need of protection. Mr . Evans writes in his diary: 
As to Mr . Egan he has done only what he v,as 
instructed to dQ from Washington, and he has done it 
eapitally well .55 
The situation was sti 11: further eompli eated by rioting 
whi ab occurred in Valparaiso in the fall of the year . 56 The 
United States cruiser, Baltimore, under command of Captain 
Schley, wa.s stationed in Valparaiso harbor. On October 16, 1891, 
he gave shore leave to a considerable number of his men, and 
most of them wandered into town that afternoon.57 In the 
streets of the city a quarrel began between a Chi lean e. nd one· 
of the American sailors, which soon developed into a street 
fi ght between a Chi lean mob and a number of the men from the 
Baltimore. In the me lee one sailor was killed, others wounded , 
and a considerable number arrested. Those detained were 
promptly r eleased, but the local investiga tion dragg ,d on; 
the sailors under detention reported treatment that aroused 
a popular demand in the United States for explanation and 
55 Robley D. Evans, A Sailor's~~· Recollections of 
Forty Years of Nava l Li fe-(New York, · 15), 276. -
56 A. Curtis Wilgus, "studies in Hispanic American 
Affairs", Arffentina , ~azil, and Chile Since Independence 
(Washington ' • C., 1905), 358. 
57 H. c. Evans, op • .£!.!•, 146. 
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apolo gy . Comin g on top of all the incidents mentioned be -
for e and on the eve of a presidential election, the incident 
served to inflame the fighting spirit of the United States. 58 
' Ca ptain Schley , ca.mmanding offiaer of the Baltimore, 
held an investigation the next morning aft.er the sailors were 
attacked . He reported tl1at it wa s brutal and unprovoked, 
that he had found his men sober and well - behaved . Blaine 
accepted this investigation as fully accurate and demanded 
through Egan prompt and full indemnity.59 
Secretary Blaine promptly took measures to s ecure an apology 
and the indemnity that would likely be forth-coming. Mr . Blaine 
thought Chi le was too small and our eountry -too large to perm1 t 
a fierce attitude toward a neighbor even when offending.60 
There could be no glory in any victory by force: and be was 
exceedin gly desirous to win the friendly cooperation and 
confidence to Chile, not to compel her submission. Me demanded 
for the Ba ltimore sailors open trial and proper representation, 
but be could not magnify a brawl into a battle. It was with 
difficulty that such a circumstance could t~ke on continental 
dimension . He formed the opinion from the Obi lean correspon-
dence that there existed a. disposition in Chi le to stir up 
hos ti li ty with the United States. 61 
58 Wilgus, £.E• ei t., 358 . 
59 H. c. Evans, .5?.E· ei t., 147. 
60 Ham1 lton , ££• ill•, 675. 
61 ~-, 675-676 . 
59 
Matta refused this demand for reparation as firmly as be 
did the appeals for safe conduct . He eould not recognize courts 
other than the Chi lean courts where a trial of the ease was 
now being held. This trial dragged on into December , after 
which he r eported that the courts were of the opinion that 
the riot was a drunken brawl and that the police bad done all 
in its power to quell the riot .62 
These reports, upon their reeeipt to Washington, did not 
meet the approval of President Harrison. With no solution 
in si ght for either the refugee si·tuation in Santiago or the 
Baltimore affair at Valparaiso, the President devoted most of 
his message to Congress on December 9, 1891, to the Chilean 
situation and especially the attack which he believed was 
hostile to the American uniform .63 He direeted Secretary 
Blaine to telegraph to Egan his conclusions v_vhieh he had 
reached after consider ing the evidence of the officer s and 
crew of the Ba ltimore and some of the others who witnes sed 
the affray . In addition Egan was instructed by S@leretary 
Bl aine to communicate to the Chilean Minister of Foreign 
Affairs tbat the .0 Matta note" of December 11, 84 aser1 bing 
untruth and insincerity to President Harrison and Secretary 
Bl aine in their official communications, was 1n the highest 
62 Ibid., 148. 
63 Ri ebardson, op. ill•, IX, 181-187. 
64 "Matta Note" , House Executive Do cum.ent, 91 (Washington, 
D. C., 1892), 179 -180. 
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degree offensive.65 
Senor Matta, who was easily angered , flew into a rage as 
• 
soon as be ~eard of President lia.rrison' s message . 66 He -sent 
a telegram to the Chilean Minister in the United States, the 
eontent of which was to be printed botb in the newspape~s here 
and abroad. 
Robley D. Evans, a commander of the battleship Yo rktown, 
wrote in his diary December 16, 1891: 
The papers here grow more and more insolent and 
I don't see how Mr . Harrison can avoid sending a.n ultima-
tum at a very early day. In the meantime the Chileans 
••••• are to get their ships ready ...... and in two weeks 
from now the Y1hole fleet will be ready for serviee.67 
Also, Evans recorded in bis diary a few days later that 
Grace and Company was trying to eonvince Secretary Blaine that 
the United States must not have war. Evans expressed the 
opinion that Harrison was for war, thet the Navy Department 
was preparing for war , and that Blaine could not stem the tide. 68 
Also, he wrote that Egan's son told him that it was all Blaine 
could do to hold Rarri son back. 6S) 
During all these turbulent weeks Chile was ruled by a 
temporary government set up after the fall of Balmaceda. Unable 
to come to terms with the new provisional government of Chile, 
65 Mr . Egan to Mr. Blaine, Dec. 14, 1891, House Exec . 
Doc., 91, ~· cit ., 181-183. -
66 "Matta Note'', December 12, lStn, £.E• .£ll•, 180, 
sbows this statement. 
67 R. D. Evans,! Sa.ilo:i:-'.!. k>g., 265. 
68 ~-. 277. 
69 lli.2,. , 28 5. 
Secretary Blaine concluded from Mr. Egan's reports that he 
would be justified in waiting until a new minister s hould be 
61 
in offi ee; that after t he newl 3 elected Presiden t Senor Jorge 
Montt, who would be inaugu1•at ed s hortly before Chri s tmas, 1891, 
an attitude of tolerati on mi ght be malnts.ined.70 However, no 
change wa s advocated. Mr. Egan sent a telegram J anuary 1, 
1892, stating that tbe differences could be settled wi th . eon-
sideration and waiting .71 
Iater the Chilean president informed Secretary Blaine 
that the Chi lean government would w1 thdra a.11 t hat was offen• 
sive to the United States.72 
Mr. Blaine now felt that Chile was willing to make apolo-
gies and to offer settlement for the "Baltimore Assault". He 
sent Mr. Egan a telegram on January 8, askin g if all that was 
offensive in the circular of December 11 would be withdrawn, 
now, by tbis new government.73 
Pereira, new Minister of Foreign Affairs in Chile, 
allowed the refugees to be put on board tbe Yorktown to be 
taken to a ple.ee of safety but not to e s cape to another ship. 74 
on tbe "Matta Note" dispateb and the "Baltimore Affair" the 
new government failed to give any sat.isfaction. 
70 Mr . Egan t o Mr . Dlaine , Nov. 10-14, 1891, Hous e 
Exec. Doe., 91, 137-140. 
71 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 1, 1892, Ibid., 187, 188. 
72 Senor Pedro Montt to Mr. Blaine, Jan. B, 18 92, Ibid., 228. 
73 Ibid., 188. 
-
74 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 12, 1891, Ibid., 188. 
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Again on January 16, 1892, Mr. Egan telegraphed Secre-
tary Blaine asking what action to take to avoid any unpleasant-
ness between the two governments .75 
Thus, the "Matta Note" 76 caused the climax to be reached. 
To Mr . Egan•s question Mr. Blaine replied that the American 
Government e.ould not take any action until the Chilean Govern-
ment bad to the requested w1 tbdrawal of the Circular, and 
wanted a prompt action. 77 
This demand so angered the Chilean Government that Jan-
uary 20, 1892, Egan's eall was demanded. 78 Secretary Blaine 
eommunicated to the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs de-
manding that if the offensive parts of the dispateb were not 
at once withdrawn and a suitable apology offered, he would 
have no other course open to him except to terminate diplo-
matic relations with the Chilean Government. Furthermore, if 
the Chi lean Government acqui eseed, space in the public press 
was to be given to the apology comparable to that g1 ven to the 
offensive expression. Upon its receipt the United States 
would then know whether any correspondence at all could be 
maintained wi tb the government of Chile upon terms of mutual 
respeet.79 
75 ~., 190. 
76 "Matta Note'' ,~., 179-180. 
77 Mr. Blaine to Mr. Egan, Jan •. 16, 1892, ~., 190. 
78 Senor Pedro Montt to Mr . Blaine, Jan. 20, 1892, 
Ibid., 229. 
79 Mr. Blaine to Mr . Egan, Jan. 21, 1892, ~., 193-194. 
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Apparently unable to come to terms with Chi le, President 
Harrison sent a spee1e.l message to Congress on January 25, 1892, 
submitting the entire correspondence for the past year relating 
to the Chilean affairs.SO Egan's actions were approved by him 
by stating that bis co r respondence bad been conducted with 
ttdignity, ability, eourtesy, and fairness." The attention of 
Congress was espe,eially ealled to Blaine's ultimatum, '1We do 
not covet their territory ; we desire their peace and prosperity. 
We characterized the "Matte. noten (December 11, 1891) as being 
offensive, undiplomatic, and grossly insulting.Q Therefore. 
if it were not at once withdrawn and public apology made, 
diplomatic relations with Chile would be terminated.Bl 
At this time 1 t was out of reason for Chile to consider 
a war againet the United States. Its fleet might do some damage, 
but the outcome of a struggle between tbe two nations ao un-
82 
evenly matched, could never be in doubt. There was, however, 
a question on the eonduct of negotiations from January 1, 
1892, on; when the new Chilean Government had been making efforts 
for a friendly settlement of the questions involved, Pres·ident 
Montt and Secretary Blaine had discussed arbitration , although 
83 it was never actually offered. 
80 Richardson, 2.£• -2!1•, IX, 215-226. 
81 Ibid. 
82 H. C. Evans, .2.l?,• ill•, 151. 
83 Senor Montt to Mr . Blaine, Jan. 23 , 1892, House 
Exec. Doe., 91, 3-5. 
--
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Just why the United States Government caus.ed further 
demands instead of expressing friendly settlement is expressed 
by Mr . Fish. He said that the political situation in the United 
States caused Mr. Harrison to take advantage of the war spirit 
to ensure his re-election and that Secretary Blaine did not 
wish to be left behind should Mr . Harrison secure the presi-
dential nomination .84 
I doubt seriously that tbis could have been the reason. 
The special message was probably given for the purpose of 
acquainting the public with international oomplieations. 
Secretacy Blaine's requests had been expressed with candor and 
sympathy. 85 Obi le bad never met any of these requests fairly. 86 
too, not only Qhi le, but the whole world now knew that the 
citizens of the{ United States were to reeei ve the same treat-
ment as those of the most-favored nation.87 
Of oourae, it is doubtful whether President Harrison 
could have bean satisfied with less than a direct apology from 
Chi le. Yet be appeared before Congress on January 25, with 
all the correspondence on the Chi lean controversy before time 
bad been allowed to receive a reply from Chile. The note was 
sent January 21, 1892, which was reeei ved in Chile two days 
\_ 
84 Carl Russell Fish, American Diploma.e:y,390. 
85 Ramil ton, 2£• ei t., 676. 
86 Senor- Montt to Mr. Blaine, January 23, 1892, 52 Cong., 
1st sess., House ~· ~-, 91, Pa.rt II ,2-7. 
87 Ibid., expressed this sentiment in note . 
later and answered the same day (January 25) that the Presi-
dent came before Congress. 
It is hard to understand the haste unless be expected 
more delay on the pa.rt of Chile. Mr. Blaine, who was a siek 
man during this winter and spring,88 oan hardly be held for 
the ae_tion taken by the President. Unfortunately, the Presi-
dent' a action here did not help the unpleasantness that had 
been growing between the President and Secretary Blaine.89 
65 
This act of President Harrison's may have been one of the 
causes for Mr. Blaine's resignation as Secretary of State a 
few days before the Republican nominating convention met . 90 
Without doubt, following January 21, tbe policy was that of 
President Harrison and not that of Blaine. Happily, there 
was no need of mediation. Tbe last refugee left the legation 
January 13, .1892. 91 
On January 26 President Montt had the Chilean Minister 
of Fbreign Affairs, Senor Pereira, withdraw all portions ot 
the ._Matta No ten that were offensive to the United States 
and to cancel th~ request fo r Egan's reeall. 92 
On January 28 these facts v.rere communi eated to Congress 
with the statement that the Chi lean message was so oonei liatory 
89 Muzzey, James Q.• Blaine, 473-474. 
90 Peck, op. ~·, 372. 
91 Mr. Egan to Mr. Blaine, Jan. 13~ 1892,, House Exec. 
-Doc • , 91,, op. Ci t • , 18 9 • 
- --
92 Ibid., 7-10. 
and friendly that President Harrison believed the differenees 
between the two governments could be adjusted on sati sfaetory 
terms.93 
Responding on January 30 to the oommuni cation of Senor 
Pereira, Mr. Blaine instructed Mr. Egan to assure the Chilean 
Government tbat tbe President would "be glad to meet in most 
generous spirl t" the r-'fri endly overtures" of the Chi lean 
Government. 94 
66 
In July 1892 the Cbiles.n Government allowed the sum of 
seventy-five thousand dollars in American gold to be distributed 
among the seamen in the riot and the families of the two who 
were killed. 95 
Thus, after mueh questioning tbe trouble with Chi le was 
settled to tbe satisfaetion of the United States. President 
Harrison said that the reparation was accepted not only as an 
indem.ni ty for a wrong don,e but as a most gratifying evidence, 
that the government of Obile rightly appreciated the disposi-
tion of the United States to a.et in a spirit of fe.1 rness and 
friendliness in its intercourse with that brave people. Fur-
ther evidence of the mutual respect and eonfidenee existing 
betwe en the two nations was furnished, said Harrison. by the 
fact that a convention submitting to arbitration the mutual 
claims of the citizens of the two republics had been agreed 
93 Moore, 2.E• ~., 494. 
94 Ibid .. 
95 Ibid. 
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upon.96 Here may be added that the eonvention was negotiated 
in Santiago b~ Patrick Egan. He continued as long as Harrison 
was president to serve the United States as lUninter to Chi le. 97 
In connection with this incident Secretary Blaine was 
subject to much unjust criticism. His adversaries explained 
the violent outburst of the Chileans against the American 
11e.t lc!'-5 ss an expression of resentment because of Blaine's 
domineering attitude in 1881, and to bis interference in the 
Civil War in 1891. Much of the criticism. revolved about 
Patrick Egan. It was charged that Mr . Egan did not report 
fully and impartially the course of events , that he needlessly 
antagonized the British and Germans in Chile; but moat of 
these reports were based upon misapprehension and falseboode •. 98 
Secretary Blaine's conduct throughout was eorreet. 99 Egan 
demonstrated ability, tact, and courage; and be was 1neorrupt• 
able. Egan quite properly maintained friendly relations with 
Balmaceda as long as his government survived, and any resent-
ment wbich the provisional government may have felt toward 
bim for this reason or because of bis off er of an asylum to 
the unfor tunate adherents of Balmaeeda was wholly without 
justification. 100 The abuse which had been heaped upon both 
96 Ri ehardson, £.E.• ~., IX, 315. 
97 Samuel Flagg Bem.1 s, American Secreta.ri es of States, 
(New York, 1928), VIII, 163. 
98 Ibid. 
-
99 Ibid. 
100 Berni s, £.E• _ill.., VIII, 163. 
Secretar~ Blaine and Mr. Egan came to them because they were 
the representatives of e. nation whose government was unable to 
net in sucb a way as to secure tbe friendship of both parties 
in a civil war, and because they made the mistake of choosing 
a loser. They were succeeding in gettin g tbe friendship 
of Chile which might in time close t he foreign exploitations 
of Chile to other nations. It is not , therefore , surprising 
to find most of the commercial nations of Rurope quite willing 
to take tbe side of tbe revolutionary faetion, when their own 
ends were to be bettered, a ge.inst a nation , the United States, 
that tried to see justioe prevai l over force and bribery .101 
The Secretary of State must have aeted from these reasons 
because all tbe8e oondi tions were very clear to Secreta ry 
Blaine. He was a life-long advocate of friendship to the 
southern republics.; and especially did he realize that if the 
United States was to succ eed in its new Pan-Ameriean movement 
68 
on which it was eenter ing its diploma t.le efforts, tha.t it would 
be necessary for hi m to continue to maintain sueb di plomatio 
efforts • 102 He had through hie entire career endea vored to 
make closer those relations of encouraging peace and fri endsbip 
as well as more e.xtensi ve commerce, and he had ·ever been willing 
to sacrifioe much for this end. 
Although this Chilean ~ffair was very i r ritating, it is 
difficult to find in Secretary Blaine's conduct of t he relation 
101 G. F. Scott, Chi le, !!! History and Developnent, 
Natural Features, Products, Commerce, and-isreaent Conditions ( Iondon, 1011>, 229 . · -
102 H. o. EVans, 2.E• .ill•·., 154. 
of the United States with Chile any desir0 to turn away from 
that policy. Mr . Blaine had grown in breadth of ideas and 
calmness of judgement since the time when he was in charge 
in 1881. lie had beoome at that time a successful politician. 
But experience, respor.sibi li ty, and reflection developed him 
into a calm and deliberate statesman.103 
69 
The intervening years, 1881-1889, found a man stronger 
in wisdom but weaker in physical strength. Garf1eld1 s Secre-
tary of State and Harrison•s great l4'ore1gn Minister were not 
the same man . He never ceased growing in wisdom, but the 
vision of 1881 was not recovered. '!'he Blaine of 1890-1892 
was not the leader in diplomatie policies , but the head of a 
department, subordinated by a not too S)7mpathetie Cbief.104 
Mr. Peek believed that Mr. Blaine eame out of the Chilean 
affair w1tb bis popularity greater even than it had been before .105 
While rumblings of war eould be heard in that period of 
1891-1892, it is indeed a satisfaction to learn that Mr . Blaine 
played no part in that drama but that he did endeavor to im-
prove and make eloser those relations of commercial friendship 
and lasting peace. 
Despite a wave of indignation in the United States, Seere-
ta.ry Blaine did not allow the Harrison administration to be 
precipitated into s. rupture .106 
103 Muzzey, op. oit., 425. 
104 Ibid . 
105 Peck, op • .£!.!•, 372 . 
106 Berni s, £E• ill_. , 758 • 
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